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Posts Tagged ‘philosophy’

Why skeptics do not, and should not, waste their time with academic theology

Sunday, October 4th, 2009

Children and fools are suffered to speak truth; priests and ministers, as men engaged in politics and advertising, are suffered to speak untruth. Like parents who deceive their children about Santa Clause, the men of God enjoy a dispensation to deceive their folds for their own good. Publicly, the shepherds give every appearance of believing what in conversations with philosophers they claim, of course, not to believe at all.

-Walter Kaufmann, from his introduction to Europe and the Jews

That the so-called ‘New Atheists’ do not waste their time engaging with sophisticated theologians is one of the most common, most pointless objections raised against Dawkins and his fellow nonbelievers. This objection, most often raised by sophisticated theologians, is based on the crucial assumption that there is something to be gained by such engagement. That this assumption is false is so evident that hearing it raised is frankly disenheartening: one imagines an unpopular schoolboy picking fights with bullies just to get a little attention. Or, more fairly, one imagines “West Side Story’s” scrawny Anybodys: all bluster, no muster, but hungry nevertheless for an attentive ear.

PZ Myers reminds us that the Emperor may be the subject of an in-depth biopic from an esteemed and respected fashion publication, but he is still naked. This “Courtier’s Reply” is the heart of any sustained attack on the flagging cult of theology. Theology is done in academic journals that nobody reads, in encyclicals that do nothing but support beliefs and practices that are already in place, and in quiet conversations between theologians outside of churches. No religious people listen unless the theologian errs in his exposition of doctrine, at which point the theologian is useful only as an example of the dangers of reason. In either end, the purposes and doctrines of the churches remain intact. The theologian makes no difference to the church, yet the theologian considers himself the apex of and spokesman for that church.

Superfluous for the believer and irrelevant to the non-believer, certainly, but is theology truly without redeeming content? Yes. The embarrassing role of the theologian is this: defend doctrine at all costs. The theologian can claim to be in the business of truth, and sometimes they even deign to conflate themselves with philosophers since their role is both academic and argument-based. This dishonest equivocation is betrayed by three simple facts. First, theologians rarely (if ever) come to conclusions that genuinely dispute the dogmas laid down by their employers. Second, on the rare occasions when they do end up disputing dogma, churches are not changed, they are simply one theologian less shortly thereafter. And third, the methods of argumentation employed in theological circles are so poor that to call them real philosophy is a slander against the rest of us.

Where there is a mystery to be resolved, such as why God permits so much evil in our universe, their defenses are either deliberately obtuse (Plantinga) or insultingly dissatisfying (Swinburne, et al). Where there is a mystery that cannot be defended even poorly, theologians do not give up doctrine, they simply state it as fact (watch Aquinas and Augustine wrestle with the contradiction of the Trinity and you’ll see what I mean).

For the theologian, it is often enough to simply drop a verse of Scripture and call the matter settled. Most of the rest of the time, theologians retreat to ancient and fallacious proofs, subtly re-brand them, and think themselves victorious when the theistically-biased journals in which they publish refuse to publish skeptical ripostes. To be called a ‘Great Light of the Church,’ Aquinas needed little more than arguments cribbed from Plato, the Bible, and decades of free time. This proud tradition continues to this day, and theologians claim their own value on these grounds.

Theology is irrelevant

We are quiet here without strife and disputes since above all else we honour the privilege of silence which is without peril.

-St.. Gregory

This brings us to one good reason that atheists needn’t bother with theology, which is that theology has no meaningful impact on the beliefs or practices of any religious people. Atheists need not engage theologians any more than they need resolve disputes with Raelians, because like Raelians, theologians worship a god or other highly impersonal abstraction that is completely unfamiliar to any religious person. Jews do not say that they worship “knowledge knowing itself,” they worship a real person with moods and emotions named YHVH. Yet Maimonides earned his stars as the greatest Jewish theologian in history worshiping just such a god. Catholics do not recite the lengthy expositions of Aquinas or Augustine, they say the Apostle’s Creed and they are content with it. Theologians make themselves into heretics in their attempts to make ancient superstitions palatable to modern audiences, and in this sense theologians are nothing more than evangelists of a new religion to undergraduate college students.

Churches trust these evangelists-to-the-educated precisely as far as they can throw them. Church authorities can out of one side of their mouth proclaim the proud intellectual lineage of their church while using the other side to condemn the same intellectuals for “erring” on crucial dogmas. Hans Kung might be of extreme use to the Catholic Church as a prop, a smug demonstration that wise men can fill a pew as well as anyone else, but this doesn’t stop the Church from calling Kung a heretic for his views on condom use and female ordination.

Conversely, a loyal theologian can work his way through an elegant proof for each step of such a Creed, but this is nothing but a dusty curio in the Church’s attic: no one reads the proof, or if someone does, he has gained nothing but the satisfaction that a man with a PhD is as comfortable parroting the Creed back at the priest as he is. No one recites creeds because their truth is demonstrated; people recite creeds because the priests says they should and everyone else in the congregation is doing it. Where religious practice is concerned, the most a theologian can do is give you a very complicated reason for doing what you are doing already.

In this sense religious beliefs are immunized against the influence of theology because such beliefs have had centuries to dispense with heretics. If someone disagrees with a core doctrine, they are not welcome in the church, and it is that simple. Given that this is the case, how could we expect a theologian in the employ of, say, a Catholic college to give us an unbiased argument against Catholic doctrine? We could not expect it, and they do not provide it, because their paychecks depend on their faculties being deployed exclusively in defense of what the believer has already been told for his entire life. If a Catholic theologian did come up with a good objection to the Catholic position on female ordination, we can expect that such a theologian would not get to call himself Catholic for much longer. It is noteworthy that the current Pope’s previous job with the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (a modern pseudonym for the Office of the Inquisitions) was to deliver threats of excommunication to such theologians. An exhaustive list of those thusly threatened can be found in the brilliant, anonymous Against Ratzinger.

The Catholic Church serves as an excellent example of the fact that modern religions are institutionally immunized against philosophical discourse. When asked to justify, say, a fundamentalist anti-homosexual dogma, or a dogma against condom use, or female ordination, or that the Eucharist host is literally and substantially the body of Jesus, no Catholic authority gives you an argument. They just tell you the page and paragrap where you can find the dogma spelled out in the Cathechism. The same is true of the vast mythology of any Christian sect: they will either tell you that a belief is good because it is the belief of the elders, or if they are in a sporting mood, they will give you a verse from the Bible. Argument and discussion is not the point, the point is the propagation of tradition. When the tradition itself is called into question, the heretic is appropriately dealt with and the conversation ceases.

Not only are religions thus immune to the kind of discourse that the whiny critics of ‘New Atheism’ demand we have, many strands of religion are explicitly anti-theological. One need only spend a moment in works like Peter Ruckman’s Anti-Intellectual Manifesto or such tracts as “The Chaplain” and “Who Is He?” to realize that good credentials and academic prestige are anathema to these believers. (While Jack Chick is on the board, it would do us well to ask if there are any theologians more widely-read than he is.) The theologian can arrogantly assume a position as a spokesman for his denomination, but the atheist knows as well as the religionist does that the theologian is just blowing smoke.

It is just as evident that theology is irrelevant because nobody reads it. If you took together every book and commentary written in defense of Biblically-adduced doctrines, would they equal even a minute fraction of the sales of the Bible itself? Of course not. People who believe in the Bible do not do so as a point of reason; reasons fall into place to support a pre-existing belief.

But why stop with the Bible? Take every book ever written by Aquinas, Augustine, Luther, Calvin, Kierkegaard and any other great lights of Christendom you please. Will their readership ever equal the readership of insultingly simplistic tracts printed by the millions and scattered at random? No. Religions do not spread with elaborate arguments, they spread with simple messages, and in fact an overly complex, overly theological religion is doomed to fail (this is why early Christians had so little difficulty out-competing Gnostics and mystery cults). The theology is an interesting accessory to be taught to an esteemed few after the religious belief is deeply entrenched in a society. It does not cause religious belief, it sustains it virtually no believers, and it never furthers belief.

This is an admission accepted as readily by the theologian. In his God, Freedom, and Evil, Alvin Plantinga makes a furiously rigorous case for the existence of God adduced from an ancient proof, but prefaces this proof with the disheartening maxim that “few who accept theistic belief do so because they find such an argument compelling.” Self-deprecating confessions of this sort abound in theology.

Churches ignore theologians just as plainly as believers do. How many theologians have, with their philosophy hats on, attacked the superstitious worship of relics, or fables about miraculous healings and dancing suns and demonic possessions? Many have, but who listens? Protestant churches will take your tithes at the revival meeting just the same.

Theology is about dishonesty

Although it is quite true that the existence of God is to be believed since it is taught in the sacred Scriptures, and that… the sacred Scriptures are to be believed because they come from God… nevertheless this cannot be submitted to infidels, who would consider that the reasoning proceeded in a circle.

-Rene Descartes

Like all great religious liars, theologians try to claim God for themselves, dismissing critics as targeting not “their” Christianity or “the real” Jesus. The god written about in the works of theology is an alien, an idol, a demiurge meant to satisfy the superstitions of their elders with the fashionable rationalism of their contemporaries. Theologians can toss around Biblical metaphors and tell us about the “Ground-of-all-Being” (Tillich) or the “Being-Itself” (Heidegger) or the “knowledge knowing itself” (Maimonedes) that they worship alone. They can whittle away the God of folk religion to a metaphysical abstraction so slender that it is unrecognizable. In fact, these are the skills at which they excel. Few are better at discrediting organized religion than those who claim to be using rational methods to defend it. This is how the great Protestant theologian Paul Tillich, a giant of our century second in his academic prestige perhaps only to Niebuhr, can deny the truth of the Bible but still count himself a Christian, or how Rudolf Bultmann called himself the same while denying the very thing that makes Christianity more than a Sparknotes version of Judaism, that is, the eternal damnation of those who fail to accept Jesus.

Theologians like to call themselves members of religions because they are dishonest. For six days a week, they write essays for poorly-circulated academic journals expounding elaborate and nuanced positions on matters of faith, but on Sundays they switch their Philosopher hat for their Religionist hat and say the same creeds everyone else does. Paul Tillich excelled at this: he advocated lying as an esteemed theological enterprise. If the simple folk religionist could be easily assuaged in his doubts, than a dutiful literalism should be encouraged. But if the questioner showed the least intellectual stamina, only then would Tillich share what he really believed and thereby keep the doubting Thomas in the faith by appealing to his intellect. Walter Kaufmann summarizes:

Tillich, however, does not favor the crude method of confronting men with arguments that he himself consdiers bad. Instead he redefines the crucial terms and cultivates a kind of double-speak. Literalists thus feel reconfirmed in their beleifs and are pleased that so erudite a man should share their faith, while the initiated realize that Tillich finds the beliefs shared by most of the famous Christians of the past and by millions of Christians in the present utterly untenable. [Kaufmann, Walter. The Faith of a Heretic,]

Tillich believed that religious belief ought to be dumbed down, if the “questioning power” in a particular believer “is very weak and can be easily answered.” (See Tillich, Paul. Dynamics of Faith. Harper, NY, 1957, Torchbooks. (c)1958. p.32-34) In his academic writing he excoriated simple-minded literalism, but thought it better that the flock be simple-minded literalists than have them exposed to the dangerous complexities of the cult of the theologian. Dishonesty this profound does not merit conversation, and how could atheists engage with such a person if their claims fluctuated with schizophrenic alacrity depending on what kind of believers were eavesdropping?

But don’t think that Tillich is the only one so guilty. This is the way of all theologians; Tillich is worthy only of such attention because his theological co-cultists hold him up so highly. Most theologians are not clergymen, and those that are do not refine their practice based on their philosophical speculations. They toe the party line in public, and in their private speculations they either do away with God entirely (as the atheist does) but use such convoluted language that nobody notices, or else they do all in their power to defend the dogma just in case an authority happens upon their writings. These cases are opposites, but they both support the conclusion: theology is a dishonest practice.

The Protestant theologian William Lane Craig is as good an example. Recognizing the poverty of his arguments, he has set himself to refining the rhetorical style with which he presents the same tired red herrings year after year rather than find new arguments. He is often described as one of the most talented theistic debaters of our time, but this is precisely the point. He can be refuted as often as he likes, as he has been in person and in writing. John Loftus, Richard Carrier, and Bart Ehrman have all refuted the dramatic misrepresentations of Biblical scholarship of which Craig is so fond (such misrepresentations include the howler that most Biblical scholars agree that the post-resurrection appearances of Jesus were historical events); this has not changed his arguments. Nor does it change the arguments of any preacher or evangelist who has met a stumbling-block, and this proud tradition of feeding the same malarkey to different audiences goes all the way back to the Book of Acts, in which Paul is said to have been confounded by Greek sophisticates and then just continued on his merry way with the same message.

Churches are as dishonest as the theologians are; this is why Anselm was touted as a genius for his ontological ‘proof’ of the existence of God, but the first contemporary to refute his argument (a fellow Catholic named Gaunilo) was utterly dismissed and only rediscovered in modern times through the work of skeptics. In this case, the Church was not interested in the truth of the matter about the ontological argument, they were interested in the propagation of doctrine. How can a conversation be had with such a mindset? Atheists cannot engage meaningfully with such institutions because these institutions have spent centuries signalling their dishonesty and their insincerity. The case of Gaunilo is one of thousands; why should we hail John Calvin as an intellectual great while ignoring his cooperation with the Inquisition in disposing of heretics who disagreed with him? Why should we take seriously a Church that coyly dangles the Shroud of Turin in front of us without taking a stance on its authenticity, saying only ‘believers can have their faith strengthened by it whether it is real or not?’

Catholicism is not alone in this regard. The Buddha himself simply dismissed all questions of theology and metaphysics as “questions that tend not toward edification.” The inventor of Protestantism, Martin Luther, went a step further, calling the use of reason to question religious dogma “the Devil’s bride” and “God’s worst enemy.” Luther’s arguments came from scripture alone, and the dogma of Sola Scriptura is one of which his intellectual descendants are the most proud. The circle is thusly established: Scripture provides the answers, and where Scripture is questioned, the faculty being employed is just a tool of Satan so do not even worry about what good sense tells you.

Even Tolstoy, thought to be one of the greatest assets of his type to Christendom until CS Lewis, shrugged off his doubts, coyly remarking that “[w]hat is comprehensible to one may seem obscure to another. But all will certainly agree in what is most important….” And like that, all mystery is gone. As long as the core of the religion is accepted, peripheral anomalies in dogma are inconsequential. This is a common technique of modern apologetics: get people to swallow the message, and doubts about the message will simply solve themselves.

Another common technique is obscurantism. William Lane Craig prides himself on the simplistic, easy-to-understand character of his arguments, yet when asked to solve the ancient Euthyphro Dilemma, he simply bellows in response “God IS goodness!” As if that solved the matter. But oscillating from simplicity into obscure language is helpful because it gives the believer a catchphrase on which to hang his own doubts, and against which to smash the doubts of the skeptics around him. The catchphrase need not make sense. It need not really answer the question. But it is helpful because one can make a creed out of it.

Theology is without substance

In my speeches and sermons that I gave, there were none of the arguments that belong to philosophy; only a demonstration of the power of the Spirit. And I did this so that your faith should not depend on human philosophy but on the power of God.

-Paul, I Corinthians 2:4-5

Whether or not all of the above is enough to dismiss the cult of theology, there is still the crucial assumption that theology has some ultimate substance with which to engage. Even if this substance is presented dishonestly, is without practical impact, and is presented from the obvious bias of “faith seeking understanding” (Aquinas’s motto), we are often told that these intellectual greats have something to contribute that atheists should take seriously.

Paul, father of Christianity, disagrees. He told generations of early Christians that genuine inquiry was insubstantial, and that is how the Patristics and the other early leaders of the Christian religion closed the ears of their congregations to Greek philosophy and other troublingly intelligent doubters. This gave rise to a whole new method of engaging with arguments: ignore them at best, and at worst treat them as dangerous. The Christian crowd that butchered skeptical philosopher Hypatia of Alexandria alive was just following orders from above.

It took until the Middle Ages, when most of the heretics had already disappeared, for Christians to think it okay to engage with the arguments of their enemies. This engagement took a hollow form: parrot a crusty proof from the Greeks or perhaps the Arabs and call it a day. It does not matter how often the traditional ‘proofs’ for the existence of God (ontological, cosmological, teleological, experiential; the proofs are presented so repetitively that they are easily cubbyholed into these simple categories) are refuted by skeptics. The elegant responses by men as diverse as Guanilo, Walter Kaufmann, and John Mackie have never stopped the religious demagogue from thundering about creationism because truthful engagement with arguments is not their business.

Even when great religious men trash the arguments of their co-believers, nobody takes notice. The greatest philosopher in continental history, Immanuel Kant, spends a good deal of his epochal Critique of Pure Reason simply feasting on the traditional proofs for God in ways that have not been satisfactorily refuted since. Yet to this day theologians build careers defending these proofs. The popular Protestant theologian Alvin Plantinga has reformulated the ontological version of these arguments ad nauseum, always in ways that traditional rebuttals are just as successful, and William Lane Craig isn’t going to let go of the cosmological argument no matter what he is told from the religious or the skeptics about its futility. They do not care to make novel or solid arguments, nor can they.

So when the religious critic of atheism demands that we atheists engage with all levels of sophisticated theology, what are they really saying? They are saying that we should copy and paste established refutations in our books and essays to their satisfaction. They are saying that we should waste as much time cribbing from the dead as they do. When one attempts to prove God’s existence from their personal experiences, how many times do we have to point out the inherent unreliability of such experiences? Until the religious person is able to read them? Until the religious person is able to understand them? Until the religious person accepts them? The first step is rarely reached, the second even more rarely, and the third step often makes the headlines (see Charles Templeton) on the rare occasion when it does happen. It is fruitless.

It is fruitless not only because religious believers usually either don’t read or don’t accept the counterarguments, but also because religious believers seem particularly adept at forgetting them. Kai Nielsen explained to William Lane Craig what is wrong with the moral argument for God decades ago, yet Craig continues to use it in his lectures and debates around the world. And why shouldn’t he? He isn’t about honesty, he’s about conversion. And so with his colleagues.

Where theologians attempt to wrestle with evil, things get even uglier. Dawkins famously points out that Richard Swinburne, a celebrated theologian, is fine with the Holocaust because of how bravely it permitted the Jews to act in the face of persecution (which doesn’t matter, because in the theology of Swinburne’s religion they’re all going to hell anyways). JP Moreland’s epic Scaling the Secular City aims to defend God’s existence from skeptical inquiry while dealing with the problem of evil in a single paragraph that concludes unsatisfactorily with “Evil is traceable to the free will of God’s creatures.” The immediate question of why God would value Hitler’s free will over the lives (and, by extension, the free will) of millions of other creatures of God is obvious, and completely unanswered in the whole literature of theology.

When the religious believer cries out for God in times of distress, they do not want Plantinga’s empty assertion that God and evil are merely possibly logically compatible, they want a real answer. And the British bishops who blamed flooding and hurricanes on the sinfulness of the English people or the American televangelists who blamed the attacks of September 11th on feminists and homosexuals do not provide this answer. When a quarter million innocents are washed away by a tsunami in the southwestern Pacific, the survivors rightfully demand an explanation. They do not get one, they get platitudes. Why should atheists waste time and pages dealing with them when their inadequacy is so painfully obvious?

Theology, like all religious institutions, demands respect where none is earned. Historically they serve only the functions of defending dogma to no one in particular, providing cover for the rare believer who comes to doubt the various absurdities of his faith, and of optimistically regurgitating the failed arguments of previous theologians. There is nothing here with which to engage. There is no novelty among them to treat with new counterarguments.

Show me a proof for the existence of God whose origins are less than five hundred years in the past and perhaps we can talk. Show me where a theologian has genuinely comforted the mother of the massacred or otherwise disposed-of child and I will reconsider. Until then, do not waste my time of the time of others claiming that theology is an accomplishment to be regarded with straight-faced serious argumentation. Quit whining about your obscurity, theologians: it is your own fault. Stop complaining about how you are treated unfairly and start earning the privilege of serious treatment. Until you redeem yourselves from a long, boring, obscure, dirty history of defending dogma, you are not worth the effort. Until you get your churches to stop appealing to magical talismans, supernatural relics, and other folk superstitions, the futility of your writings is apparent. Until you get the religious con-men who refer to you only in the improbable circumstance of the one intelligent doubting believer to stop shouting “but where’d all this stuff come from?” or “but why’s this stuff look so pretty?” or, as Job’s friends were so fond of saying, “your suffering is your fault,” you have not made enough of an impact to warrant our attention. The God you worship is either unfamiliar to religious believers, in which case you are a heretic, or he is completely congruent with established creeds and dogmas, in which case you are irrelevant.

Now that that’s settled, I say we atheists get on with our lives and resume chuckling at the poor schoolboy who smacks us in the shoulder just to get our attention. He is a petty, lonely boy who craves a moment in the sun, nothing more.

Atheists and agnostics are the same thing

Tuesday, August 4th, 2009

There are a million definitions out there for what the words “atheist” and “agnostic” mean.   Let’s start with what they do not (and cannot) mean.  They do not mean degrees of openness to evidence.  I only say this because I’ve encountered the claim that atheists are closed off to the possibility of god, and agnostics aren’t.  But just like agnostics likely do not believe in the tangible existence of smurfs, if they ever met one they would immediately change their mind, as they should; atheists are the exact same way.  If shown smurfs (or a god), or evidence of them, we will change our minds.

Others say that to be agnostic means to say that we cannot know.  There is much to say about this.  First, and most obviously, why can’t we?  Is it really too early to say that people cannot rise from the dead, and that to accept such a proposition without evidence is indicative of lazy thinking at best (and insanity, at worst)?  I don’t think so.  Even for the ambiguous god of deism, the best I’ve ever heard as a defense for “we cannot know” is that people cannot imagine any other way existence could have happened (forget, for a moment, that god would have had to exist to create all of this).  But that’s not an argument, it’s simply a lack of information (either on their part or on humanity’s part) or a lack of imagination.  You can honestly say that we do not currently know, and that is fine – but you lack the knowledge of the future (amongst other things) to say that we cannot know.  Additionally, to say that we cannot know about god is to treat the idea of knowledge in an absolutist fashion, which I’ll argue in the following section is not the way we utilize that idea.  Anyway, my arguments for how we can know about god’s non-existence with reasonable certainty (which I’ll tackle in the following section) can be found throughout this blog and over at my regular blog.

I’ve heard others say that to be agnostic means to believe there is a god, but to admit that we know none of his properties (although, I’d more associate this with deism).  These people suffer from the same philosophical failings as other believers.

However you view the term agnostic, I will argue that doing so entails misconceptions about the nature of knowledge or a poor analysis of the evidence on hand that, once resolved, will reveal that you are no different from an atheist.

The nature of knowledge.

For even our most certain claims, we must allow for the possibility we are somehow wrong.  Even something as simple as 1=1 might not be true (you may be dreaming this life, and in the real world this is not the case).  So what we do is we attach probabilities to truth claims based on the evidence on hand.  While I’m pretty sure that there are no purple, nine-legged insects with heart shaped candy eyes and a radio dial on their forehead on this planet, we may one day turn over a rock and find a colony of such insects.  While this is highly unlikely, it would be wrong to deny it as a (very distant) possibility, and thus my claim that there are no such insects is not absolutely certain.

While it’s not relevant to the discussion on atheism versus agnosticism, it should be noted that even god would be subject to these constraints.  What if he was wrong about being omniscient?  What if a demon is feeding god his every thought?  Such a demon could even make god feel omniscient and god would never be the wiser.  God would have to allow for this possibility, and so even he cannot have 100% certain knowledge.  The point is that what we’re after is not absolute certainty, we’re after reasonable certainty.  Ideas that are so likely to be true that they are as close as we can get.  Atheists accept this.  We are not saying we are absolutely positive that a god does not exist.  What we are saying is that there is no good reason to believe that there is one and plenty of good reasons to believe there isn’t one.  We say the same thing about unicorns, leprechauns, and purple nine-legged insects.  Agnostics also accept this on propositions that allow for it, which gets me to my next point – often, it is how these things are presented that determine our approach to them.

The nature of propositions.

Another claim I’ve heard of agnostics before is that they say “we cannot know”.  To me, this seems euphemistic for “we cannot falsify”, and they’re right.  However, claiming belief in an unfalsifiable proposition which bears no supporting evidence because nobody has managed the impossible is to fall victim to the trap of a self-fulfilling prophesy.  For instance, if you believe in smurfs with no corroborating evidence because we’ve yet to comb our universe to its very edges (a feat that would be tedious and impossible) to prove there is no centimeter of space-time (how’s that for a conflicting idea?  :P ) where a smurf exists, you will never be able to escape your absurd belief.  Instead, we need to realize that if a proposition of existence, such as that of smurfs, gods, and celestial teapots, has no evidence, then that IS evidence for that object’s non-existence.  Should we ever come across any evidence for these objects, we’ll happily change our minds.

Furthermore, as I said at the end of the previous section, whether we are agnostic (in the sense of saying we can’t disprove a proposition or we can’t know about a proposition) or atheistic (saying that it is so highly improbable as to be considered reasonably certain) about a proposition often has more to do with how those propositions are presented than anything.

Consider two gods, we’ll call them god Pork and god Beans.  They are identical in that they both have power as unlimited as the universe allows and are, in each example, the author of the universe.  Here is the difference.

God Pork uses his limitless power remove all evidence of his existence.  In this case, the absence of any evidence for the existence of Pork IS the evidence of his existence, and every discovery ever made will conform to the idea of this god.  It is impossible to be anything but an “agnostic” about Pork.

But god Beans, he uses his limitless power to provide you with irrefutable proof of his existence.  We lack irrefutable proof of his existence, so it is impossible to be anything except an atheist about Beans.  You cannot be open-minded to the existence of Beans because he is a contradiction of logic.  It would be like saying there is a married bachelor – you cannot have both.

Richard Carrier originated this argument and articulates it better than I ever could.

Recap

So, to you people that call yourselves agnostics, how do you really differ from atheists?

  • Are you open to the idea of a god?  So are we.
  • Are you unsure about the existence of god?  Why?  Are you also unsure about the existence of smurfs?  Of nine-legged purple insects with candy eyes and radio dials?  Why one and not the other?
  • Obviously, we can know some things: how to open a door, that scratching our crotch will not open a door, that the Sun will rise in the East tomorrow, that “National Treasure” is amongst my DVDs (I just looked up at random).  Why can’t we know (by any sane definition of the word) if there is a god, by use of all the available evidence?

This should help to explain why I called agnostics lazy thinkers in a recent post.  I do not mean to imply that they are dumb (I do not even believe that Christians are unviersally dumb), but that agnosticism requires some lazy thinking to maintain.

I will be looking to modify and add to this, so please post objections.

A positive case for rational hope

Monday, July 20th, 2009
“If I told you that I thought there was a diamond the size of a refrigerator buried in my backyard, and you asked me, why do you think that? I say, this belief gives my life meaning, or my family draws a lot of joy from this belief, and we dig for this diamond every Sunday and we have this gigantic pit in our lawn. I would start to sound like a lunatic to you. You can’t believe there really is a diamond in your backyard because it gives your life meaning. If that’s possible, that’s self-deception that nobody wants.” ~ Sam Harris

I recently did a post about how even though faith is often defended by Christians claiming that it gives people hope, that faith is actually a very poor outlet for hope.  Afterward, Ben from War on Error asked me to make a positive case for how hope is better found in reason.  Ok.

Personally, I think this sentiment can be explained in two sentences:  It does not matter how good a belief makes us feel, it will not unmake the realities we are trying to escape.  However, if we have the courage to be honest about unpleasant things, we can make reality more comforting.  However, I’m sure that people will want more elaboration, so here we go.

There is an enormous difference between false hope, hope that doesn’t rely on an accurate assessment of reality (in fact, it exists only by closing our eyes and ignoring reality), and actual hope that if the facts of the universe are not what we want them to be, we can change them.  Through the last several thousand years, we have hoped for cures to diseases, technology to take us to the moon, plentiful food, clean water, etc, and through looking at these problems bravely, without trying to shield ourselves from the unpleasant fact that we lacked those things, we were able to turn our hopes into realities.  However, first we had to admit that we did not have the things we wanted, and we had to take a long, dispassionate look at our problems.

When we hoped to reach the moon, we did not know how we were going to get there, but we didn’t just close our eyes and imagine we had already made it and call it a day: we worked, we thought, and we actually made it happen.  But in order to make it happen, we absolutely had to open our eyes and understand the circumstances before us, whether they were comforting or not, as they truly were.  Faith merely allows people to ignore the very variables of reality we must acknowledge in order to fix them.  It is the panicked shriek of a coward that they cannot bear to look at what frightens them, they cannot bear to face it, and so they just imagine that it’s not that way.  Such people are never held in high regard elsewhere, but yet we consider such behavior to be noble when applied to the finite nature our very life.

Believing that death is not the end of our ability to experience things will not make it so.  But by acknowledging that fact, we can begin to make as much our of our time as we can, rather than sitting around and waiting for the paradise we’ve dreamed up.  We can even join other doctors in dedicating our lives to finding ways to prolong our time on Earth.  In short, we can begin to make the universe the way we want it to be, and we can seek the best possible solution as a reality – not merely imagine we’ve already found it.

In this way, faith – the mere belief in things when reasons fail – is the purest conceivable distillation of false hope.  Because it hinges on not acknowledging reality for what it truly is, it is actually antithetical to genuine hope.

So the next time a Christian tries to paint you as a bad person for taking away their hope, remember that false hope can only be benign at best, and can often make your actual circumstances worse.  Also, remember that genuine hope is not merely a sentiment of an individual; we have collective hopes as families, as societies, and most importantly, as a species – and false hope is merely going to drive us into ground, which is not at all worth the trade off of flimsy comfort we get by ignoring reality.  True hope only comes from having the courage to be honest about unhappy facts and circumstances – it is the only way we can truly conquer them.  Ultimately, we can close our eyes and pretend the train isn’t there, or we can admit we’re in deep shit and at least try to jump out of the way.

Hope doesn’t come easily – you have to have some moxy.  Faith offers us false hope that is easy; it’s for the lazy and the cowards.  You’re upset that I’m pointing out that you have false hope but that there’s actual hope available?  Ok.  I can live with that.  Maybe it will toughen your skin so that you can survive the brush with reality that genuine hope requires.

On hope as a defense of faith

Thursday, July 16th, 2009

One of the worries that inevitably gets raised when criticizing faith is, “Where do we get hope if not from faith?”  I’ve made a somewhat egocentric mistake in thinking that because the answer seemed obvious to me, that it would for others.  I will now take the opportunity to rectify that mistake.

First, hope does not equate to truth.  The truth sometimes can be downright unpleasant, since it does not conform to our sense of wishful thinking the way religions do.  So you need to ask yourself what your priority is: do you want your beliefs to be true or simply positive?  They cannot always be the same.  There is a very large (and consequential difference) between hoping you have won the lottery and believing you have won the lottery, and failing to draw that difference would be quite a costly mistake.

Second, hope can be found most abundantly not by embracing unreason, but by mapping out reality as accurately as we are able.  Every 200 million years on average an asteroid of sufficient size to annihilate most life on Earth will strike the planet.  No amount of hoping otherwise will alter this fact.  However, by acknowledging this fact, we can then set our collective minds to finding a solution.  It should be clear to anybody that hoping to find a solution through effort is a much more full and meaningful hope than simply hoping the collision event won’t happen.  The hope of religion, in opposition to the unpleasant facts of the universe, is merely the hope of closing one’s eyes rather than facing the oncoming problem.  That is not hope; it is ineffectual cowardice.

Third, an examination of Christianity will reveal that there is very little hope to be found.  We have this idea of Hell, this eternity of suffering so great that every second the agony of it escapes human comprehension millions of times over, exists because god allows it to (he could easily unmake it, being omnipotent and all), and the only way to avoid it is through a lifetime of groveling and thanksgiving followed by an eternity of the same?  This is hope?  These are very similar to the current conditions in North Korea with the cultish atmosphere of worship created by Kim Jong Il.  If you do not grovel and thank him for your very right to eat and live, you are to be punished.  Is this tyrant benevolent because he allows those who bow and scrape to escape the prisons and mortal punishment that are there by his command?  If this is love and benevolence, it is hard to imagine tyranny.  But god’s punishment is infinitely worse, and his standards infinitely more unfair.  To pass god’s test, I must not merely prostrate myself before the dictator, I must also believe that events took place that are admittedly impossible by their very definition (miracles) – a feat that I argue is impossible.  This is hope?

And even if the situation weren’t so terrible, even if Christianity did offer something that really did sound appealing, is it really hope if it’s based on an untruth?  I would argue that hope based on a lie is just false hope, and that it’s nothing to be proud of – especially when actual hope, the kind that can help us face the unpleasantries that exist whether we have the courage to acknowledge them or not, is attainable through intellectual honesty.  We just need to learn that we can run faster without the crutch – as scared as we are to let go of it.

Not enough that your faith is different

Sunday, July 12th, 2009

When “truth” is to be weighed by scales of faith, no belief is discernible from another in terms of credibility. As Friedrich Nietzsche once put it, “A casual stroll through the lunatic asylum shows that faith does not prove anything.”

On a daily basis you can find numerous cases of people doing insanely stupid, dangerous things because they were driven by faith. So often we hear cries that the atheist has caricatured faith by pointing these things out. The charge is that we are highlighting a handful of extremists (of course, there’s far more than a handful), and we are admonished to accept that these people have somehow gotten faith wrong. This statement is usually followed by a pablum of condescending sighs and an insistence that the moderate’s faith teaches something completely different than the lunatic in question. But what are religious people really expressing when they say that a particularly dangerous person’s faith is not their faith? Here are some options.

1. My faith is more likely to be true than theirs.
2. My faith is not more likely to be true, but it is more benign.

I can’t think of any other implications we could glean from that sentence. Can you? Leave a comment and I’ll add them if you can.

I think the second option once thought through defaults back to the first. Maybe god wants us to kill certain people (if you’re a Christian, you must admit that he has wanted it before), and if faith can lead us to truth then you must be aware of why your faith is more likely to be true than the extremist’s faith, since you think god wants something different than what the wackos say god wants. Therefore it’s not enough to simply say that your faith is different from that of the extremist – you must show us how the extremist gets faith wrong – you must show how your faith functions on a different mechanic that is “right”, and how that makes your belief about what god wants more likely to be true than theirs. After all, you’re both trying to act in accordance with god’s will, right? You just think that god wants us to do something different.

Of course, faith does not eject the false and keep the true – the notion of faith can embrace any belief. Faith is a horrible tool by which to acquire truth (think of all the people who follow faiths that aren’t yours…most people on Earth must be wrong if you’re right). Faith is a means to circumvent reason and reality. A single person in the 21st century believing that a man walked on water 2,000 years ago would be considered crazy, it is merely the number of people who believe it that rescues the believer from that assessment. As Sam Harris put it, “It is merely an accident of history that it is considered normal in our society to believe that the Creator of the universe can hear your prayers, while it is demonstrative of mental illness to believe that he is communicating with you by having the rain tap in Morse code on your bedroom window.” Because faith is a means to reject reason and reality when they threaten to obliterate a belief, faith disarms us of our only tools to separate credible truth claims from non-credible truth claims, and often makes bad ideas it allows us to adopt immune to any conceivable challenge from the world of evidence. It is clear that the moderate’s faith is no more likely to be true than the extremist’s because they operate on the same mechanics, even if the moderate’s faith is thankfully less dangerous.

Because both faith that leads to murder/discrimination and faith that leads to charity operate under the same principle, it is impossible for me to criticize one but not the other. I am a critic of lazy thinking, and both sides of the theological coin are equally guilty. Citing to me that your faith is different does not rescue it from this accusation, and it certainly has no bearing on whether or not the nutjob got faith wrong – perhaps god really is talking to him and not you.

What I Believe for the 21st Century – Tauriq Moosa

Friday, July 10th, 2009

Along with Bertrand Russell, it is importance to consider what one believes rather than what one knows. Knowledge, the evanescent sphere that humans touch upon to ascend to higher planes of comprehension, is mostly unimportant: It is the beliefs that we hold. Indeed, modern philosophers like Roger Scruton regard epistemology not as the study of knowledge but the justification for our beliefs. In this short space, I am aim to succinctly outline my current beliefs with the goal of checking up on them in one year. I hope readers do not find this self-indulgent but rather a project of epistemic duty, to which each person should scrutinise for themselves. If there are alternate and better views, many current views should be rescinded or replaced.

I believe…


  • …nothing is sacred and the attempt at sanctification brings nothing but dogmatic human assertion onto an otherwise neutral world. This is not to be confused with not thinking certain thing highly important: for example, I do not believe in the “sanctity of human life” but I believe very strongly in fighting for people’s autonomy, freedom and their pursuit of happiness.
  • …many current governmental policies, even in “Western” liberal democracies, are premised on knee-jerk emotional responses which cater to the masses. We need a thorough reassessment based on evidence rather than emotion if we wish to help our fellow Man. Thus, our policies on drugs, capital punishment, education and the automatic respect for religions to dictate on important moral issues needs at the most rescinding and at the least thorough consideration.
  • …suppression only worsens rather than ameliorates most social problems. Thus, we should legalise drugs (from marijuana to cocaine), prostitution, pornography, abortion,  euthanasia and similarly related constituents of “immorality”. Conservative moralists tend to consider a slippery-slope that as AC Grayling put it works like this: “If you eat two bananas, you are going to want to eat a million.” We can already see the irrationality of such an approach. Firstly, if people want drugs, abortions and euthanasia, they will usually find a way to get it. Secondly, we already have arbitrary instances of various allowances of these prohibitions: we have legalised alcohol and nicotine (both of which are far worse than other drugs, like say marijuana); we don’t blink when we give a pet a good death (the literal meaning of euthanasia) but shudder when the gaze shifts to one of our own. This again goes back to considering something sacred, rather than looking at something humanely – that is, it is more important for someone to have life, even if it is filled with suffering, than to have no life and therefore no suffering. Also, those who chant the mantra “drugs are bad” should remember that for the most part, even alot of so-called hard drugs when taken in minimal circumstances do little to no damage.
  • …when entering the public sphere, all ideas are open to criticism, debate, mockery and scorn. If we eliminate the stupid notion of sanctity, we can allow that ideas are man-made and therefore fallible. The point is to weed out the bad and keep the good but that can not be done if certain ideas are beyond criticism. For too long we have lived under the shadow of a respect for people’s faiths but no longer must that be the case. We should care more about people and creating a better world, than hushing our own important criticisms which could better more lives by being spoken rather than placating dormant lives with silence.
  • …we should not be afraid to defend our point of views strongly, but more importantly we must be able to utter 2 three-word sentences: “I don’t know” and “I stand corrected”. Sure, we may feel like imbeciles when we vehemently defend a view which turns out to be wrong. We should then apologise and say so, rather than making the situation worse by deluding ourselves into naive dogmatism. Nobody really cares anyway because no one is keeping tabs on how often you were right. Also you will be right by acceding to your opponent or antagonist (even if there are say, your brilliant philosopher girlfriend), because you will be able to correct those who shared your previously held view.
  • …religions are a disgusting affront to human sensibilities and are perverse for accruing various properties. It is both tedious and mortifying to constantly read about religious groups opposing abortions, same-sex marriages, prostitution, drugs, freedom of speech and expression, liberty, and so on. In each case, we can probably name a few cases where religious people who deem their actions sanctified (there is that notion of sanctity again!) by a god have killed someone who is part of these movements. Religious people often refuse to face facts and evidence, as is the case with for example evolution and contraceptives, and instead point to arbitrary passages in their arbitrary (sacred) book.  Religions not only reward people for horrifying actions like the slaughter of innocent people, but also rewards people for believing without evidence. It also rewards people for peering into other people’s private lives which, if ignored, would not hinder their own lives at all (how could a happy homosexual couple going about their business make the lives of say a normal family horrid, unless they were Christians and told by their holy book that homosexuality is an affront to god?)
  • …the most disgusting affront to our species and the biggest fight we have is the continued emancipation of women and bringing their hands to tightly clutch the banner of liberty. Especially in such places as Africa, where we know that when women are allowed charge over their own bodies, we can end poverty. Poverty will not be solved solely though charity – we know that will not work. Instead, we must seek charity’s root, namely karitas or the love of fellow humans. This means liberating women which reduces poverty by not dealing out already low resources to an inestimable number of offspring, who themselves grow up to continue to breed and create more people to suffer needlessly. Aside from poverty, we need to push back the patriarchy of society to realise that women (who do better than the male counterparts in education) are human. Religions also aid this patriarchy by giving men a divine sanction to use their wives as nothing more than cattle. There are too many instances to name in Islamic countries that they might collectively be called Misogynia. By combating these arrogant and stupid men who think women are lower than themselves, we will be pulling the carpet from under the feet. The biggest wake up call that Muslims states could suffer would be a woman, wearing clothes of her choosing, smiling and enjoying her own mind and body. A respect for the minds and their bodies should be welcomed, not solely for the purpose of the male related urge to have sex, but also for the appreciation of the beauty of both. Personally, women are the better sex and it is often said that if god was a woman, the world wouldn’t be in such a mess – perhaps the only statement of an anthropomorphic god I could agree with.
  • …we need a re-evaluation of why we procreate. To the Greeks, everything was an ethical dilemma: even the clothes you wore. To them the ethical life was a life well-lived and living ethically was a life-long challenge. We tend to forget this view, with its importance on self-reflection. Applying this to all spheres would end a lot of social problems but it needs to be consistent. Thus, to be consistent, there has yet to be a good reason laid out for the procreation of  our species. As I write this, I am of the opinion that it is immoral to create new people, since it is by definition impossible to have a child for that child’s sake – because the child does not exist when you conceive him. Parents do not know their children for quite some time, so it is impossible to say that parents have children for that child’s sake. To have a child is simply a selfish act, a biological need (arguably the most prominent and therefore the most overlooked!). Why have kids? It is a bizarre question to most people, but as of yet there has not been a satisfactory answer. To continue the human species is not good enough either, since I do not care for those who do not exist. I care and apply my moral sphere to those who exist. Those who do not exist do not suffer. Also, we must remember that our species will die out eventually and we only prolonging the inevitable. It seems harsh and to some horrifying, but it is rather simple. For this reason, I at this moment will not have children. Instead, I think our efforts in helping people to procreate and the “sad” fact that people are sterile, needs shifting to aid children who are already alive. That is, instead of focusing on children who do not exist, focus on those who do! Perhaps this is what irks me the most – there are so many children who need loving families and I do not doubt that people who want kids simply want a child to love. Therefore, they should not add to our overpopulated word, but simply adopt. Psychological testing has shown time and time again, there is no difference in affection and love between children who parents adopt and children born to biological parents. I believe it a human duty to shift our silly polices on those “unlucky people who are sterile” and who can not create new people; and instead promote the humanity and importance of adopting people who already exist.
  • …reading is the gateway to living the good life and engaging in discussion with ideas its path. Epicurus was the embodiment of this, who thought the highest aim in life was sitting beneath a tree discussing philosophy. Whilst we can not reasonably expect such a life today, we can approach it with the same considerations. Reading is a joy and should be shown to young people when their minds are finding fruition and goal. Like education, reading should not be promoted by forcing children to read certain books, but how and why they should read in the first place. People find their hunger grow when reading and the acquisition of “knowledge” becomes a life long goal. There is nothing pretentious in reading Tolstoy and Faulkner’s books, indeed they are beautiful and actually simple writers. They are classics because even the general reader is able to enjoy its beauty, whilst stuffy introverts like myself could dissect it for in-depth literary criticism. There is also much joy to be gained in reading opposing viewpoints, thus reading books for and against evolution, for and against god, for and against postmodernism, and so on. We enjoy debates for their entertainment value and watching one side get overturned by the brilliance of the other; but we also allow people in better positions than ourselves to criticise more eloquently and with better information. It is a joy: try (really try) for example reading a work by Derrida (perhaps a short one) than try Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont’s Fashionable Nonsense or Ophelia Benson and Jeremy Stangroom’s Why Truth Matters.
  • …by studying philosophy, I hope to bring it further into the public sphere where it belongs. Much is to be gained from the history of ideas and discussion within philosophy. Not least the clarification and use of critical thinking so important to this discipline. Moral philosophers need to be higher placed within our society than say, bishops and rabbis – for the simple reason that moral philosophy is not moralising – i.e.: it is not about setting out a list of “Thou shalt…” and “Thou shalt not…” but the clearing of verbose emotional reactions and alternate paths not previously considered. The first person journalists should contact when an ethical dilemma arises from medical advancement should not be the public or a religious don: it should be a bioethicist. After outlining all the paths and conjectures surrounding the topic, others can contribute more coherently. This should be the job of the philosopher in general, to clear the path for discussion to continue maturely.
  • …sex is overrated. In nearly every sense, sex finds itself at the top of the list for both those who consider themselves godless liberals in their “FOR” list, and for the conservative moralisers in their “AGAINST” list. If sex was less the topic of focus, it could be allowed to be the healthy, enjoyable actualisation of affection two (or three or four) people have for each other.
  • …I am not intelligent or bright. I reserve such terms for those who deserve it and find it a particularly insulting when an important property finds itself attached to me. As an example, I did terribly in high-school, barely passing. I did even worse in a tertiary institution, only managing firsts in English literature – a degree, nearly anyone could do well in. I am not exceptional in any way, save that I am particularly good-looking.
  • …that last sentence was a lie.

I hope that by next year one of these would have changed, either to be replaced with something more informed, or elucidated more clearly. For example, I hope to be able to say that I am working from a tertiary institution. Until then, let us see what changes the world makes upon itself.

The Incoherent Spheres, or the Need to Be Understood

Thursday, June 25th, 2009

The story of Medea is something of a “classic” of philosophical investigation, if such things as classics could exist in such a sphere. The focus in Eurpides’ play centres around the daughter of King of Colchis, Medea, in a dilemma. “Dilemma” is somewhat of an understatement, since it rests in deciding whether to murder her children or not. The tragedy of this play lies in the central human need to be understood– in Medea’s case it is the need for her blinkered husband, Jason, to understand all she has been through to marry him. She has watched her family ties be defenestrated; she has endured the ousting from her country of birth. Yet, Jason has decided, being the brutish man he is with his horrible Y-chromosome, to leave Medea and their sons for something sleeker and sexier (and no doubt something without umbilical attachments). Medea of course is in outrage, having gone through much strife to simply be with Jason – yet in the blink of a Grecian eye, Jason has tumbled headlong into the comforts of someone else. Our sympathy is hardened into protracted vengeance and we yearn for Jason to feel some pain as recompense; thus we can at least identify with Medea’s need to make Jason feel the pain she has gone through.

We understand her.

But its her actual decision which is philosophically interesting. Her decision is to literally severe the umbilical ties which unite Jason to her. That is, she decides to murder her sons to allow their hot blood to raise the heat of outrage within their uncaring, ossified father.

Stoics, Epicureans and sceptics have gazed upon this dilemma till their eyes were sore with wonder. Professor Julia Annas, in her broad outline of the various responses to Medea’s dilemma, states that the Stoics would have disagreed with Medea herself who thought that anger was dominating her reason. There are no “two parts” to Medea – she was a unified whole. Plato perhaps – we don’t know his actual position on most things since he spoke through characters and not from an official standpoint, like Aurelius – would have said there is a conflict, relating to different parts in Medea. Namely her passion and her reason really are in conflict. Someone like Galen, a late Platonist, would have thought that reason and anger were battling in the “soul” of Medea and eventually anger won.

Medea of course eventually kills her children.

What has this story or this investigation got to do with anything? As I stated in the beginning, it rests mainly in the need to be understood. Medea has an urgent need for Jason to understand her – post hoc, of course, but it seems that if he had understood what she had been through and (more importantly) appreciated it, he would not have left her so suddenly. The need to be understood is perhaps the central problem of philosophy, or at least an echo of the whole human enterprise, often called the “human condition”.

I don’t rightly kno what if anything is the human condition but I imagine it is this: What we consider internally often finds no harmony with what occurs externally and our need to reconcile these two incoherent and disharmonious constitutions leads to all manner of problems, with ourselves, others and the world as a whole. This we might consider a possible definition of the “human condition” (though I will be the first to say it is not a resolute or final one).

For example: We consider ourselves to be central to our lives, since the events and people we affect and focus orbit our sphere of knowledge. Yet to the universe at large and the earth as a whole, we are merely infinitesimal, insignificant bundles of perception, moulded by the fingers of nature and given a spark of consciousness as a cruel joke. We die and rot and amount to dust, which the closing fist of the universe will drive home into meaninglessness. We create meaning and yet we are largely meaningless, to the large expanse of time that has come before and will arise after. Meaning is meaning made in the face of meaninglessness.

For further illustration: We struggle and fight for things we believe in. We find certain books, careers, people important. Yet to most people, these important people (to us) are to most others unimportant because they do not know them.

These are illustrations of the incoherent nature of considerations between what occurs within our minds and what exists independently of our thoughts of them (I here take it for granted that, like GE Moore, I have two hands). This is labelled “absurdity” by many philosophers, like Mark Rowlands, and is thus central to all interesting and “important” dilemmas.

Absurd is of course another reason for the problem of lying; lying is thought to be bad for the simple reason that it is an echo of insanity. You are presenting reality as it is only to you, but reality does not actually exist like that. You lie and tell your parents that there is no girl in your bedroom, but there is one. Or perhaps you lie to your friends and say you were with a girl, when you were not. Both, if believed seriously by the speaker, would constitute madness since the girl is either there or not – independently of whether you assert it or not. Thus it only takes your parents checking in to confirm your statement. This makes lying, according to some philosophers, a resemblance to insanity, which is not a good thing if one is trying to formulate a coherent picture of reality. The only difference is that one is aware that the world is not as one says when one is lying; insanity, one does not know – or, rather, one believes the uttered falsehood.

Medea and her choices are “absurd” only to the extent that her inner feelings needed to find a balance or expression externally. This might be a reason for the need for humans to create art; our consciousness – which might be defined as the awareness of the incoherence of our external and internal spheres – allows us to take a full-throated cry of internal silence to a melodious utterance in the outer sphere of reality. (Reality, Nabokov once said, is the only word that was permitted to always be written in between quotation marks).

This is why we struggle to understand one another. We are already struggling to understand our significance in our immediate spheres and their ripples into the wider sphere of the world. Our creation of meaning is forever the building of sand-castles upon a stormy beach; we are fighting against a strong tide of reality, bashing against the rocks which themselves we hope will bleed. Reality will have none of it.

If we take this thought further into the sphere of the social world there are worse problems. Consider: the sphere which you represent, as a lawyer, academic or liberal fighter (for example) is part of a larger group. When you speak, you speak as “we”, which is nothing but a pluralised first-person viewpoint. Thus when you (plural) are fighting against, for example, the oppression of women, you are taking your internalised, important and, according to you, sensible beliefs into another wider sphere. It does not chime, it finds no harmony. Thus we have conflict, we have a forced view of reality thrust upon another sphere. We have the liberal secularist spheres attempting to free those who live under the conservative, Islamic one. For both, the absurdity does not rest with reason or logic or mutual understanding. It rests primarily with each sphere running down the rocks of reality and being pulled in by the tide of the external world.

One way we can begin to change does rest however in the use of reason to justify our beliefs and our ideas. This is why we need to begin to shift our own positions on many things we take for granted, which I will speak about next time. These might be thought of as the target areas of applied ethics, though one is often ignored by many: namely, the creation of new people. But with these thoughts in hand, I hope the reader will be able to follow me as I target key issues next time: things like science, drugs, creating new people and abortion, and animal ethics.

Science Types and Their EQ

Sunday, November 2nd, 2008

PZ was in Toronto this weekend. (Actually, he still is in Toronto as I write this, but I am not.) Much to my surprise he didn’t make me any level of livid or even angry. I got disgruntled by a few of his points here and there – but overall I found on the topic that he was speaking to (education + science + religion) I generally agreed. But his talk spurred a discussion between me and a couple others about “those science types” and their “emotional intelligence”…or generally…lack there of. (I can hear teeth grinding already! Where’s the love?!)

I’ve read a crap load of books on “emotional intelligence”. Most of them I find to be a bit shaky and questionable, but I see some validity in the arguments and ideas that are being presented in a general term. Emotional intelligence, in very simple terms is one ability to interact with people, gage their emotions, have an idea about social discourses and the effect that their inputs will have on the overall social feel. One gages their own, and other’s, emotions and make what they deem to be appropriate judgments on how they should react. There are three main models that I’m not going to explain in any sort of depth. I imagine if you wikipedia it you’ll find them all nicely laid out for you.

In general they all have the same premise: see the emotion, capitalize on the emotion, understand the emotion and properly manage the emotion. Some say its the ability to fit into social groups and adhere to social norms, other say its the ability to manipulate and use people in those social groups. Either way, it all starts with those four basic function of using emotion.

Just as I am aware of what EQ is, I am also fully aware of all the problems that other people have pointed out in the philosophies, models and theories… so you don’t need to explain them to me. What I want to be clear on, for the purposes of this post, are what *I* mean when I say “EQ”… I mean having the skill to read, interact and appropriately mingle with and manipulate individuals or groups. I think that’s pretty straight forward… I am not claiming that we could call it a form of “intelligence” or that it is measurable or denying that there is an ability to fake this type of “intelligence very easily”… etc. There simply exists deep social skills that allow a person to literally read and gage the emotions of a person and use those to their advantage or use them to approach situations appropriately.

This is the part when you all start to get mad at me – all these “science types” have very little of this EQ. I will admit, up front, that some of them aren’t missing this important social quality but most indeed are. The sort of group we get at CFI, the people I knew in my physics program in first year, the types that talk to me after our science lectures… etc all have this shocking inability to blend into social settings. Not only that, but when I talk to them its as if they’re not registering any of the emotion that is attached with my words. If I’m joking, they don’t get it. If I’m being sarcastic, trying to get a serious point across or getting really angry – they don’t react. And it’s not like I’m an emotionally blank person…You can tell very clearly when I’m happy, sad, joking, angry… etc. well, if you’re able to gage emotions you can, anyway.

Not only does this make conversations that aren’t about science, rationality or critical thinking a total snorefest and completely awkward, but it’s also…why I think… it’s difficult and almost impossible for them to grasp the emotional happenings of the other side of things. Such as cultural relativism, (I’m not saying things like the definition for the word “book” should be accepted as relative, but things such as a definition of spirituality and religion…could very well be…or something) or seeing religion as something valuable to someone else. This is a problem because it’s a whole new area of narrow mindedness. The only things that are valid to them are what they have empirical evidence for – the emotional arguments for things are just not understood…instead, because they have a lack of understanding about science they’re just seen as carbon blobs. And when they attempt to make philosophical arguments it has to be totally logically sound instead of adding in some emotivism.

The lack of understanding of emotions, (or …as I learned from Larry Moran not too long ago – he just doesn’t care about emotions…) and inability to put themselves in the mindsets of other gives them no consideration of the effects that could be happening as a reaction of their actions toward others. Calling their entire value system and view of life as “ridiculous”? That’s just not acceptable, it hurts people. If they’re choosing to live the way they are, the most we can do is offer services, lectures and educational programs for them to be exposed to. If they choose not to use these resources, that’s fine. We don’t need to destroy their religions, we just need it out of the public sphere. There is a time and a place for emotional decision making such as creativity, empathy and comforting…, just as there is a time and a place for empirical/scientific or statistical decision making such as in the lab, school or when you’re attempting to find the scientific truth to life.

I’m sorry – but not everything in life can have science trailing right behind it, and just dismissing the emotions of people doesn’t make them disappear.

Book Review: Thus Spoke Zarathustra

Thursday, August 21st, 2008

Thus Spoke Zarathustra by Friedrich Nietszche

The first thing I thought to myself while reading this book, is “why the hell did I never read this before.”

I had heard about the things Nietszche was famous for, like the phrase “That which does not kill me only makes me stronger.”

Or we remember Paul Dano’s lovable tortured teen character in the film Little Miss Sunshine.

We know Nietszche is supposed to be tough, negative, the word “nihilism” comes up, nihilism being often described as the most hopeless amoral position.

This does not match my reading of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, which I found to be inspiring, full of positive messages, and extremely uplifting.

The book parodies the bible, somewhat ironically, where the main character Zarathustra wanders the world like an atheist Jesus, preaching the gospel of the Superman.

The Superman, or “Übermesnch” as many of us have heard it called, is Zarathustra’s only transcendental promise. The Superman is compared to lightning, and Zarathrustra proclaims that the Superman is what is to come after man is surpassed. Yet it is so close because you know that with effort it could be you, since the Superman describes humanity at its best.

Zarathustra hails unconventional virtues like will, for Zarathustra exercising your will is comparable to the Kingdom of Heaven in the bible. The will in this book is the high road, a thing to be embraced in of itself. This framing of will makes it a state of being to be sought, to be willful, to be ambitious, to master that which is before you. Its really beautiful.

Zarathustra hails solitude, like a beloved lover. He condemns traditional morality, saying that it is something to be surpassed. Zarathustra condemns conformity, and throughout the book hammers in to the reader that life is something to be lived passionately.

One of the most beautiful lines in this book is when Zarathustra is pestered by one of his nay-sayers he says that “Where Zarathustra cannot find something to love, there he will pass by.”

To only go where you can find something to love is such a wonderful rule to live by, a true embrace of the fact that the only heavens any human will ever know are those which can be found in this life.

I strongly recommend this lovely book, and hope to hear from many of you about your opinions.

Beware Secular Humanism!

Wednesday, August 20th, 2008

Why should you beware secular humanism?

If you have been hanging on to your religious beliefs by clinging to the impotence of the so called “atheist movement,” secular humanism is the cure to that impotence.

Secular humanism can actually replace faith.

So many of my theist friends will cite how religion provides values and an ethical compass as they navigate through life. Indeed, for many this is exactly what religion does.

Many clever, moderate, religious people will state: “If there is no God then life is meaningless, we are alive only a short time, and even the sun will die. What can there be if all the love I feel, all the relationships I build are for no greater purpose?”

Atheist will often deal with these claims by pointing out how important truth is or how exciting science is, as Richard Dawkins does , without realizing that what it sounds like to thoughtful religious ears a lot like:

“Yeah life really is bullshit, deal with it! And if that makes you depressed, pull out your highschool biology homework, that will make you feel better!”

Good grief!

Don’t get me wrong, I love Richard Dawkins and I owe it to him that I broke free from religion, but his book gave no comfort as I abandoned the comfort of religion.

In fact I was seriously depressed for months.

Dawkins book worked on me because I was already undergoing studies in neuroscience, and had accepted science as the best way of knowing what is true, and I was won on Dawkins’s appeal to scientific reasoning.

But as much as I love science, in of itself it gives me little existential comfort.

I need to feel good in my own skin, after all, and religion provided that for me as it does for so many.

It wasn’t until I read “The Birth of Tragedy” by Nietzsche that I got some relief. “The Birth of Tragedy” essentially argues that art is the meaning of life.

This may sound as appealing as Dawkins “biology homework” cure for existential crisis at first but bare with me.

I draw, have been known to dabble with music, and love performance art. I have felt some of my greatest highs, philosophical and otherwise while engaged in the artistic endaevour. It is a form of self-exploration so furious, so lustful, so powerful. It is inquiry at its rawest, and I did not decide to seriously pursue science until I saw this link between it and art.

For me to do anything it has to be art.

Art is simply pregnant with meaning and power, a virtual positive feedback loop of passion.

What “The Birth of Tragedy” got me thinking was first, “life is art,” and then progressively “life is an art.” That is, there is an art to living life.

When I finally began to read the Secular Humanist ethics of Paul Kurtz, it was in this vein that I embraced it. Kurtz provides beautiful reasoning for the values of acts, behaviors and other ethical questions, but he also emphasizes the raw lust for life, the wanton embrace of the time you have in this world. And it is precisely because the time you have in this world is so rare, so fleeting, that you should live with lust, exuberance, and great joy. Even purpose as Kurtz says that the good life requires a beloved cause.

As I began the Secular Humanist process in my life I found something that I never expected as an atheist, sense of meaning, purpose, and joy that outdistances that which I experienced as a religious person.

So many of the people I have met through secular activism seem to have been atheist since the earliest days of their lives.

Many of you, my beloved life-long atheists, fail to understand why people fall for religion. I fell for it because it enriched my life, and having my life enriched was worth not deeply questioning the truth of it all. I passively accepted bold claims because the package came with meaning, power, and purpose.

But I have found this great thing, collecting the dust of disuse, that has real competitive power against the utility of religious faith: secular humanism.